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Abstract - Until the implementation of the ATEX directive
94/9/CE, the certification of equipment intended to explosive 
atmospheres was only dedicated to electrical equipment.
Since the 1st July 2003, the non-electrical sources of
inflammation are also to be looked at before putting an ATEX
equipment on the market (pumps, couplers, reducing gears,
…).
Among these sources, mechanical friction and impacts are a 
main cause of ignition of explosive atmosphere. The risk 
analysis of the equipment consists in considering the failures,
which can lead to ignition. If the failure involves a friction
between two parts or an impact, we shall estimate if this
friction or impact dissipates a sufficient amount of energy to
ignite the surrounding explosive atmosphere.
As part of the European program MECHEX, we have
studied the process of degradation of the mechanical energy 
into heat during friction and impacts and we have examined
the mechanisms of ignition at the contact zone.
An extensive experimental program is presented and some
“simple” modelling is proposed on purpose of practical 
applications. For frictional situations, a critical rubbing power is
calculated without any limitations as for a potential lower
boundary concerning the rubbing velocity. For “impacts”, the 
relevant parameter for ignition is not the kinetic energy of the 
projectile but its velocity and the nature of the materials.
Index Terms — ATEX, Mechanical ignition source, Non-
electrical Equipment
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the implementation of the ATEX directive 94/9/CE [1]
in July 2003, the non-electrical sources of inflammation shall
also be examined before putting an ATEX equipment on the 
market (pumps, couplers, reducing gears, …).
European harmonized standards have been developed by 
CEN/TC 305 WG2 to give requirements for non-electrical
equipment. The basic standard for non-electrical equipment is
the EN 13463-1 [2], which requires an ignition hazard 
assessment of the equipment.
Concerning mechanical equipment, this assessment often 
underlines the possibility of mechanical friction or impacts as
an ignition source during foreseeable or rare malfunction.
When such a source appears, the manufacturer shall estimate
if the friction or impact dissipates a sufficient amount of energy 
to ignite the surrounding explosive atmosphere.
The European program MECHEX was dedicated to the
study of the process of ignition during friction and impact.
In the first part of this paper, the actual requirements for
mechanical equipment are given. The main results concerning
the ignition by friction and impact are presented in the second
part and some practical implications in the last section.
II.  REQUIREMENTS AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT
A. Requirements of Directives and Standards
Non electrical equipment are dealt with in directive 94/9/CE
when placed on the market for use in hazardous areas 
(concerns firstly the supplier) and by directive 1999/92/CE
[3] when intended to be installed in hazardous area 
(concerns firstly the user).
The essential health and safety requirements of the directive
94/9/CE demand among others that the manufacturer take
measures to prevent the ignition of explosive atmospheres,
taking into account the nature of every electrical and non-
electrical sources of ignition. Some supplementary 
requirements are specific of the category of equipment :
• For category 1 (equipment intended to zone 0) :
Equipment must be so designed and constructed that
sources of ignition do not so become active, even in the
event of rare malfunctions.
• For category 2 (equipment intended to zone 1) :
Equipment must be so designed and constructed as to
prevent ignition sources arising, even in the event of
frequently occurring disturbances or equipment
operating faults, which normally have to be taken into
account.
• For category 3 (equipment intended to zone 2) :
Equipment must be so designed and constructed as to
prevent foreseeable ignition sources which can occur
during normal operation.
The directive 1999/92/CE demands that :
• The employer shall ensure that a document, called
‘explosion protection document’, is drawn up and kept
up to date. This document shall contain the
demonstration that work equipment is designed,
operated and maintained with due regard for safety.
• Work equipment for use in hazardous area which was 
made available in the undertaking or establishment for
the first time after 30 June 2003 shall comply with the
directive 94/9/CE (with the category adapted to the
zone).
• Work equipment for use in hazardous area which was 
already in use or was made available in the undertaking 
148
or establishment for the first time before 30 June 2003 
shall comply from that date with the minimum
requirements laid down in Annex II, Part A. So all
necessary measures must be taken to ensure that the
work equipment have been designed, constructed,
assembled and installed, and are maintained and 
operated, in such a way as to minimize the risks of an 
explosion.
To comply with the requirements of the Directive 94/9/CE we
may generally use the harmonized standard EN13463-1. We
can also use the frame of this standard to carry the hazard 
assessment of the equipment that is already installed and to
include this assessment to the explosion protection document
demanded by the directive 1999/92/CE.
The standard EN 13463-1 is based on the assessment of
the ignition hazards of equipment depending on the category
of this equipment. It can be used as a stand-alone standard 
but for mechanical equipment the standard EN 13463-5 [4] is
generally used in addition. This standard defines the protection
concept “constructional safety” with marking “c”. The principle 
of this type of protection is to apply constructional measures so
as to protect against the possibility of ignition from hot 
surfaces, sparks and adiabatic compression generated by
moving parts. The requirements are based on good 
engineering principles, so that risk of mechanical failures likely 
to create incendive temperatures or sparks, are reduced to a 
very low level.
B. Ignition Hazard Assessment
The ignition hazard assessment consists in reviewing all
potential ignition sources of the equipment and in
distinguishing normal operation, expected malfunction and rare
malfunction. Then will be considered the measures applied to
prevent each source becoming effective.
Concerning mechanical equipment with moving parts the
hazard assessment will often underline the risk of friction or
impact as an expected or rare malfunction. That could be the 
case for instance for pumps when there is no more fluid and 
where parts could enter in contact in rare malfunction. We can 
also think to the bearings or to the friction of a roller on a rail.
When the malfunction introducing a risk or friction or impact
is identified, the problem is then to determine if this friction or
impact could become an effective ignition source or not. The 
type of source could then be a hot surface or sparks but it is
difficult to know if the phenomena are sufficient to ignite the 
explosive atmosphere.
III.  MECHANICAL FRICTION AND IMPACT
A. IGNITION RISK BY FRICTION 
Friction between two solid bodies is a process through which 
mechanical energy is transformed into heat. Experience 
reveals that heat is produced in the rubbing zone where the 
material is severely stretched and diffuses outwards. It is well
known that the amount of heat evolved is in proportion of the 
applied force and sliding speed [6].
Further, if the friction is sufficiently intense, some material
may be torn away resulting in fragments being expelled. This
event is sometimes called “friction sparks” or “spark shower”.
Experimental equipment
For a given heat power produced in the rubbing zone [7],
traditional thermodynamical laws tell that the maximum
temperature may depend on some geometrical sizes (area of
the contact zone, diameter of the machine,…) of the rubbing
equipment. Mainly for this reason, two experimental set-ups 
have been used (figure 1). The configuration of a fixed slider
rubbing onto a rotating wheel has been selected because a 
rather precise control of the rubbing parameter is amenable.
The larger device [8] is a 30 cm diameter wheel, 22 mm
thickness rubbing against a 40 mm high, 25 x 25 mm square 
cross section slider for most tests. The sliding velocity can be
adjusted between 0.2 and 20 m/s and the normal load
between 0 and 5000 N.
The smaller device is a 10 cm wheel, 8 mm thick rubbing
against a 15 mm high, 7 x 7 mm square cross section slider.
The sliding velocity can be adjusted between 0.05 and 
15.7 m/s and the normal load between 0.2 and 1000 N.
Temperatures have been measured by optical methods and 
thermocouples. During the tests, the normal load, friction
coefficient and speed were controlled [5, 8, 10].
Figure 1 : rubbing experimental set-ups (Large scale 30 cm
dia. wheel- left and small scale 10 cm dia. wheel –right)
The evolution of the rubbing temperature as function of the
nominal power expressed in terms of normal load (N) times the 
sliding velocity (V) is shown on figure 2 for the various sliders
used and the two machines. There is a clear trend of
increasing the rubbing temperature as function of the nominal
power. There is also a clear incidence of the nature and of the 
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Figure 2 : Rubbing temperature as function of N.V for
various sliders and the two machines (on the top, only with the 
small scale equipment, in the middle, only with the large scale 
equipment and on the bottom graph a comparison of the 
results with the two machines with a hard steel – mild steel
rubbing configuration)
In some tests, flying fragments (sparks material) have been 
collected in order to evaluate the size of them and the wear
rate. For steel rubbing against steel at a few m/s, the typical
particle size seems of the order of a few hundred of mm and 
the wear rate, extremely dependent on the experimental




The analysis reveals that ignition during friction and impacts
may result from three different processes [7] :
• In direct contact with the hot rubbing zone whenever the 
local temperature is large enough according to the 
mechanism of the hot plate [9]. The experimental
investigation and some theoretical evidence shows that
the critical parameter is the temperature of the hot zone,
of the order of hundreds of °C;
• The power dissipated in friction may easily be of the order
hundreds of Watts. If the friction is occurring in a 
sufficiently confined area, the mean temperature of the 
ATEX may rise and reach the autoignition point. This
situation should well be represented by the standard 
ignition temperatures ;
• The sparks may be a cause of ignition. However, since 
the initial temperature at the beginning of the flight should
not be different from that of the rubbing zone, the sparks 
are likely to constitute a preferential cause of ignition only
if, later in their flight, their temperature increases well 
above that of the rubbing zone. This may occur if the 
flying particles are able to burn. In this case, the ignition
process may be linked to the spark ignition mechanism
referring to minimum ignition energies.
Ignition around the heated surface
This ignition mechanism is believed to be the main cause for 
mechanical ignition [8, 12] often invoked but, to our knowledge,
never really proven.
For friction, experiments performed with the large scale
rubbing machine used in explosive atmospheres and filmed 
with high speed video [8] demonstrate clearly that ignition
proceeds at the rubbing zone. It occurs as soon as some
critical temperature threshold has been reached at the rubbing
zone. These temperatures have been estimated for a number
of atmospheres (hydrogen-air, methane-air, propane-air,
ethylene-air, diethyl-ether-air, acetone-air,…) and compared to
critical temperatures determined previously [9] for hot surface 
ignition in explosive atmospheres (Tpcrit).It has been realized 
that both sets of values correlate extremely well demonstrating 
that “frictional” ignition is a “hot surface” ignition mechanism. It
has been however noted that the critical hot surface 
temperature does not seem to correlate so well with the 
standard autoignition temperature  nor better with the minimum
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Figure 3 : tabulated critical hot surface ignition temperature 
and observed contact temperature upon ignition during friction
150
Volumetric ignition
Experiments on the small scale rubbing machine with
steel_steel configurationhave shown only a moderate increase 
of the average temperature throughout a volume in closing the
wheel (40°C) and inside the spark shower as compared to the
temperature reached at the rubbing zone (700°C). So the 
ignition should occur most probably at at the hot contact zone
before any possibility of ignition throughout volume could arise
[5].
Sparks 
There was no evidence of any ignition to be undoubtedly 
attributable to a flying spark in the present experiments [5].
There was even no evidence of any fragment to burn in the 
surrounding atmosphere even in the extreme situation of
aluminum rubbing intensively against hard steel. Is it to be said
that only the situation of a light alloy rubbing against some
rusty material and leading to “thermite reactions” [12] is to be
considered for “spark” ignition during friction ?
To help and clarify this important point, explosive
atmospheres were submitted to a small chemically inert and
artificially heated object, simulating a fragment [5]. Globally, 
the required temperature to produce ignition is well above the 
critical “hot surface” temperatures apart from the specific case
of sulphur, which need to be further analysed. Thus, it is
confirmed that the “spark” temperature need to be well above 
those of the rubbing zone to generate an increased risk of
ignition suggesting that the fragments have to burn somehow.
Modelling
These findings have been analyzed and collapsed into a 
reasonable model [4]. It is postulated that ignition would occur
at the hottest point, in the immediate vicinity of the rubbing
zone (we thus leave apart the special case of « thermite » 
reaction). Following, the ignition parameter is the critical hot
surface temperature defined before, depending on the nature
of the atmosphere. We then have to derive the contact
temperature from the frictional process and compare it to the 
former. The standard Coulomb-Joule relationship has been 
used to calculate how much heat is produced in the friction,.
This amount of heat is driven out from the contact zone by
thermal conduction and is modeled as a local heat source onto 
an semi-infinite solid [10]. The final equation reads:









• Tf : temperature of the rubbing zone
• Tamb: ambient temperature (boundary
temperature of the bodies)
• R : radius of contact area 
• A : contact area
• λi : heat conductivity of body i in the rubbing zone
• f : friction coefficient
• N : normal load
• V : rubbing velocity
• q : heat dissipated in friction
For the practical use of this expression within the frame of
explosion safety, the following aspects need to be considered:
• a proper choice of the critical ignition
temperature must be made. For explosive 
atmospheres, the relevant parameter would be
Tpcrit which is above but not directly related to the
standard ignition temperature ;
• the area of the contact zone depends on the 
geometry of the device and may be found with a 
detailed analysis of the system. It should not be
smaller than the ratio of the normal load to the 
Brinell Hardness which gives a lower boundary
for R ;
• the critical power dissipated in rubbing (q=f.N.V)
is the part lost in the friction which, in normal
operation, is usually a very low fraction of the
nominal power, typically a few percent for friction
coefficients of the order of 0.001 to 0.01. Only in
case of severe malfunction (a shaft broken, a
fused bearing…), the friction power may reach
the nominal power with a fraction coefficient
between 0.1 and 1..
Some comparison between this simplified method and 
experimental data is shown on figure 4. Here, the rubbing
situation typically corresponds to a severe malfunction as 
defined above with a friction coefficient equated to unity. The 
model gives a lower estimate of the critical power but is
































































































From literature Present work
Figure 4 : performances of the simplified model for frictional
ignition against existing data [7]  and results issued from the
present program
This physical analysis implies that the maximum
temperature in the rubbing zone depends only on the friction
power without any limitations about any lower boundary about
the rubbing velocity. For instance, it has been possible to ignite
propane-air, ethylene-air and hydrogen-air mixtures at rubbing
velocities equal to or even smaller than 1 m/s, which has been 
sometimes given a “safe” limit [10].
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B. IGNITION RISK BY IMPACT
Experimental equipment
The experimental facility consists of a free fall vertical
device. The target is a strong mild steel plate (5 mmx70 
cmx45 cm) anchored on a rigid thick wood plate (11cm)
impeding flexion during impact. The plate is inclined to favor a 
glancing blow. In most experiments the angle of 60° has been 
chosen. The projectile (diameter 18 mm of steel, aluminium,
copper,…) is propelled by an air cannon on a precise point of
the target at variable velocity between 5 to 50 m/s.
Figure 5 : Experimental impact test equipment
The impact was filmed with a high speed camera in order to
estimate the impact speed and to detect the fragments.
Simultaneously, the temperature in the contact zone was 
measured with a high speed monochromatic pyrometer [5, 7].
A sample of those measurements is shown on figure 6. The
impact results in a sharp temperature rise (up to hundreds of
°C in a few tens of microseconds) followed from a rapid but
more progressive decrease (in milliseconds). Usually a chip is








































Figure 6: typical temperature reading and excepts from the 
high speed film (18 mm steel rod of 20 cm long, impacting at
10 m/s)
Some data are shown on figure 7 for various experimental
conditions. The impact temperature depends primarily upon 
the impact velocity and nature of the material and only very
weakly on the size of the projectile. A further analysis of the 
same data shows that the impact temperature is not correlated 
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mild steel rod - V = 7 +/- 0.5 m/s
mild steel rod - V = 38 +/- 10 m/s
aluminium rod - V = 4.5 +/- 0.5 m/s
copper rod - V = 5.5 +/- 0.5 m/s
mild steel rod - V = 20 m/s
Figure 7 : Maximum impact temperature of the hot spot for
various conditions 
The physical analysis of the results [5,7] suggests that the
efforts, deformations, fragment production… should be the 
consequence of the strain waves produced in the very first
moments of the impact and propagated at the speed of sound 
in the materials. These waves are responsible for the rebound.
The experimental evidence suggests also that heat is
produced due to some intense but very short rubbing on the 
target during the time of the rebound. while the projectile slides 
against the target with the tangential component of the impact
velocity. The amount of heat produced is then driven away by 
transient thermal conduction A model has been proposed 






( ) LVKfTT mambimp ⋅⋅⋅=− 2
where L stands for the length of the projectile and V the
impact velocity. Timp is the peak temperature reached during 
the impact. Km is a composite parameter dependant only on
the intrinsic properties of the bodies like sound speeds,
specific masses and heat capacities, thermal conductivity Km is
typically of the order of 10 (20 for steel) in SI units.
About ignition, both the fragment, if any, and the hot spot
may contribute to ignition equally because of their similar size.
It has been found also [5], that the ignition process is closer to
a hot spot mechanism as described before than to the
standard spark ignition mechanism. Because of the short
duration of the hot spot during an impact, the critical ignition
temperature appears larger, by a factor between 1 to 2 
depending on the atmosphere.
For the practical use of the preceding expression, a friction 
coefficient of 1 may be selected. √L may easily vary in more
than a ratio of 10 whereas Tpcrit varies only in a ratio of 2 . It is
then tempting to use this formula by setting Km to 20, a rather
large value, and Timp to 550°C, one of the smallest practical
ignition temperature, L being the remaining unique variable 
equal to the largest dimension of the projectile. It is finally very
simple to find an order of magnitude of a critical impact
velocity, capable of igniting an explosive atmosphere. A
comparison with data from the literature [7] is presented in
figure 8.
Figure 8 : performances of the simplified model for impact ignition against existing data
The comparison is less favorable than for friction but impact
ignition tests are difficult to perform because of a rather poor
reproducibility. Nevertheless, this very simplified approach
seems conservative apart from the specific situations of
“thermite” reactions or large objects, mostly because, we
believe, the exact geometry of the projectile is not precisely 
known.
As a final remark, the kinetic energy of the projectile does 
not appear, at any moment, neither in the data reduction of the 
experiments nor in the theoretical approach as Rasuo [11]
noticed earlier The velocity of the impact appears as a more
convenient parameter.
IV.  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing simplified models are issued from a more
sophisticated tool in which the various equations are solved 
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numerically. The latter gives less conservative results than the
former with exactly the same trend [5]. Both can be used for 
practical applications.
The basic parameters to feed into the models are the nature
of involved material, the size of the equipment, the explosive 
properties of the atmosphere, the velocity (sliding velocity for
friction and incident velocity for impact), the normal load and 
frictional area for friction. The temperature in the contact zone
is calculated and compared to the critical hot spot temperature 
for the atmosphere.  
Some examples of applications are presented below.
A. Lifting screw
Within the scope of the CE certification, the case of a lifting
screw devoted to the transfer of combustible powders was 
studied. The screw is a long helical steel wire turning inside a 
steel sleeve (inner diameter of the sleeve is about 150 mm, 10
mm wire diameter). The device is driven by a 5500 W electrical
engine at 1500 rpm. Hazard assessment reveals a risk of
friction of the wire against the sleeve. The explosive dusty 
atmosphere has a standard ignition temperature of 240°C
suggesting a critical hot spot ignition temperature of about
700°C [9]. 
With a thermal conductivity of steel of the order of 15 W.m/K
and a rubbing size of the order of 10 mm (diameter of the 
wire), the critical temperature could be reached for a frictional
power as low as 400 W according to the simplified friction
model presented above. This finding may be compared with
the experimental data of figure 2 if we consider that this lifting
screw is somewhat comparable to the experimental rubbing
machines in size. At 700 °C, the friction coefficient is about 0.3 
so that N.V for the lifting screw should be about 1500 W, in line 
with the data obtained with the small scale machine.
Although rather indicative, this result suggests that the power
of the machine is larger enough to generate immediately a 
dangerous situation in case of steel-steel friction. The 
simultaneous presence of a dust atmosphere inside the sleeve 
should then be avoided by ensuring that the device is always
full with bulk dust at full power for instance.
B. Turbine 
We have examined a turbine with a mobile part in aluminium
and an envelope in alloy of steel-aluminium.
The diameter of the wheel was 340 mm. The nominal speed 
was of 3500 tr.min
-1
 and the peripherical speed was of 62 m/s.
We have considered the case of a piece of alloy steel-
aluminium blocked between the rotor and the casing of the 
turbine generating a strength of 3,6 N.
The use of the foregoing simplified expressions reveals that
the rubbing temperature at the contact point will be about
416°C, which can be compared to the critical ignition hot spot
temperature of an explosive atmosphere. In the practical
studied case it has been demonstrated that there was non 
ignition risk.
C-Gasoline feeder
A gasoline pump supplier is concerned by the explosion 
hazard raised by a new type of connector to feed LPG in cars.
The possibilities of an impact of the connector on some solid
surface and of a friction due to the rubbing along a moving
vehicle were identified. Impact and rubbing experiments have 
been performed. Both the connector and the rubbing/impact
surfaces are mainly made of steel. The typical diameter of the 
connector is 5 cm. Given the geometry of the connector, a 
typical rubbing size of 10 mm was chosen.
For LPG, the critical ignition hot spot temperature is about
650°C. At this level of temperature, the steel-steel friction
coefficient is about 0.3.
The use of the foregoing simplified expressions reveals that
the critical impact velocity would be of the order of 23 m/s and 
the critical rubbing power of about 800 W (N.V = 
800/0.3=2500 W). Experiments have shown that the peak
impact temperature is about 630°C at 28 m/s and the rubbing
temperature is close to 300°C with a rubbing power of 400 W
(N.V = 1200 W). Recalling that the rubbing temperature has 
been observed to be approximately proportional to N.V, the 
experimental observations seem coherent with the predictions.
On the practical side, those values seem high with regard to
the normal way of operating the device and the considered risk 
might only appear in case of rare events.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the implementation of the ATEX directive 94/9/CE in
July 2003, the non-electrical sources of inflammation shall also
be examined before putting an ATEX equipment on the market
(pumps, couplers, reducing gears, …).
European harmonized standards have been developed by 
CEN/TC 305 WG2 to give requirements for non-electrical
equipment. The basic standard for non-electrical equipment is
the EN 13463-1, which requires an ignition hazard assessment
of the equipment with the list of all potential ignition sources.
Depending on the category of the equipment (1, 2 or 3),
inducing the area where it can be installed (zone 0, 1, 3 or 20,
21, 22), the assessment has to be carried considering only
normal use or also foreseeable or rare malfunction. The same
work can be done to ensure that the equipment already in use 
fulfills the requirements of the directive 1999/92/CE and can be
described in the explosion protection document.
Concerning mechanical equipment, this assessment often 
underline the possibility of mechanical friction or impacts as an
ignition source during foreseeable or rare malfunction. When 
such a source appears, the manufacturer shall estimate if the 
friction or impact emits a sufficient energy to ignite the 
surrounding explosive atmosphere.
The European program MECHEX has permitted to study the
process of ignition during friction and impact. The process of
degradation of the mechanical energy into heat during friction
or impacts and the mechanisms of ignition at the contact zone
have been studied.
An extensive experimental program is presented in this paper
but many points have only been surveyed. It was found that,
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apart for the very special situation of “thermite” reactions,
which has not been investigated in this program, the “sparks 
shower” resulting from the production of fragments in the 
contact zone is less dangerous than the high temperature of
the friction or impact area. It has been noted that the critical
parameter is the temperature of the hot surface, a property of
the mixture, which does not seem to be closely linked to any 
known standard ignition parameters.
Some “simple” modeling is proposed on purpose of practical
applications. For frictional situations, a critical rubbing power is
calculated without any limitations about any lower boundary
concerning the rubbing velocity. For instance, it has been 
possible to ignite propane-air, ethylene-air and hydrogen-air
mixtures at rubbing velocities equal to or even smaller than 1 
m/s, which has been sometimes unduly given a “safe” limit.
The main variable is the friction coefficient the prediction of
which is not easy: it varies from 0.001 to 1 depending on the 
lubrication and materials.
For “impacts”, the relevant parameter for ignition is not the 
kinetic energy of the projectile but its velocity and the nature of
the materials. The experimental data are not sufficiency to
valid the model and more experiences need to be lead.
As practical implications, some results of MECHEX have
already been taken into account in the redaction of the second
edition of EN 13463-1. Some limited couples of parameter
speed/torque of rubbing have been introduced instead of the 
only speed limit of 1 m/s which was given in the EN 13463-5.
We have presented in this paper some practical cases 
where the simplified model has been used. The materials in
contact, the considered atmosphere, the speed and torque
shall be known. The surface of contact is estimated and the 
model calculates the temperature of rubbing or impact zone
and compares it to the critical ignition temperature of the 
explosive atmosphere. It may help for the hazard assessment.
On the other hand a certain time is necessary to reach the
maximum temperature at the rubbing surface and some
equipment may use this parameter for implementing a 
detection of the failure that will induce the rubbing.
The model should still be tested on other practical case. 
Some complementary studies would be necessary to
determine the time to reach maximal temperature by rubbing.
It would also be interesting to have a better knowledge of
the value of the critical ignition temperature as a new data for
the different explosive atmospheres as it seems not to be
correlated with the known data of autoignition temperature 
(AIT) and minimal ignition energy (MIE).
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